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“NO ONE DOES THAT ANYMORE”: ON TUSHNET,
CONSTITUTIONS, AND OTHERS
Penelope Pether∗
The social learning process . . . couples learning about exaggerated
reactions to perceived threats with a persistent creation of an Other—
today, the non-citizen—who is outside the scope of our concern.
Perhaps, indeed, we are able to discern exaggerated reactions, and
learn to reduce their reach, only because we are able to displace our
concerns on to that Other. The Whig version of social learning does
identify a real process in which government policy in response to
emergencies has a decreasingly small range, but a more pessimistic
view would direct our attention to continued focus of the policy on the
Other.1
A democracy can destroy itself no less than an autocracy.2
It is true . . . of journeys in the law that the place you reach depends
on the direction you are taking. And so, where one comes out in a case
depends on where one goes in.3

∗ Professor of Law, Villanova University School of Law. Thanks are due to
Villanova University School of Law students Sarah Stevenson (J.D. 2007) and Jonathan
Charnitski (J.D. 2008) for research assistance, and to Villanova University School of Law
Dean Mark Sargent and Associate Dean for Faculty Research John Gotanda for research
support.
1. Mark Tushnet, Defending Korematsu?: Reflections on Civil Liberties in Wartime, in
THE CONSTITUTION IN WARTIME: BEYOND ALARMISM AND COMPLACENCY 124, 136 (Mark
Tushnet ed., 2005) [hereinafter Tushnet, Defending Korematsu?].
2. Paul Kahn, Comparative Constitutionalism in a New Key, 101 MICH. L. REV. 2677,
2694 (2003).
3. United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 69 (1950) (Frankfurter, J. dissenting) (“It
makes all the difference in the world whether one recognizes the central fact about the Fourth
Amendment, namely, that it was a safeguard against recurrence of abuses so deeply felt by the
Colonies as to be one of the potent causes of the Revolution, or one thinks of it as merely a
requirement for a piece or [sic] paper.”).

667

PETHER - Final Edit 2 - 26-3

668

5/20/2008 9:23 PM

QLR

[Vol. 26:667

Mark Tushnet is strongly identified as a scholar central to whatever
Critical Legal Studies (C.L.S.) was. Here, I am differentiating U.S.
C.L.S. from what I would argue is a living Critical Legal tradition,
largely based outside the United States, and at least partially and loosely
linked with the Critical Legal Conferences,4 usually held in Great
Britain, rather than the Conference on Critical Legal Studies.5 Tushnet
has made his considerable reputation as a scholar of U.S. constitutional
law.6 With increasing frequency, his constitutional law expertise—most
evident in his profound understanding of the history of both U.S.
constitutional hermeneutics7 and Supreme Court judging,8 and in his
acute and extraordinarily well-informed reading of the scholarship of
constitutional hermeneutics9—has been harnessed in exploring
comparative constitutional thought.10
The title of this Essay was prompted by a remark made by my
spouse, who, like me, is a scholar and teacher of law, and also a relative
latecomer to, and/or fellow traveler, and/or intellectual inheritor, and/or

4. See
generally
Critical
Legal
Conference
2008,
http://www.criticallegalconference.com/index.html (last visited Mar. 24, 2008).
5. See generally Cornell University Law School Legal Information Institute (Wex),
Critical
Legal
Studies:
An
Overview,
http://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/index.php/Critical_legal_theory (last visited Mar. 24, 2008).
6. See, e.g., MARK TUSHNET, RED, WHITE, AND BLUE: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1988); MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM
THE COURTS (1999) [hereinafter TUSHNET, TAKING].
7. See, e.g., MARK TUSHNET, THE NEW CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER (2003) [hereinafter
TUSHNET, NEW].
8. See, e.g., Mark Tushnet, The Burger Court in Historical Perspective: The Triumph
of Country-Club Republicanism, in THE BURGER COURT: COUNTER-REVOLUTION OR
REFORMATION? 203 (Bernard Schwartz ed., 1998); MARK TUSHNET, A COURT DIVIDED: THE
REHNQUIST COURT AND THE FUTURE OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (2005); THE WARREN
COURT IN HISTORICAL AND POLITICAL PERSPECTIVE (Mark Tushnet ed., 1993).
9. See, e.g., LOUIS MICHAEL SEIDMAN & MARK V. TUSHNET, REMNANTS OF BELIEF:
CONTEMPORARY CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES (1996); Mark Tushnet, The United States:
Eclecticism in the Service of Pragmatism, in INTERPRETING CONSTITUTIONS: A
COMPARATIVE STUDY 7 (Jeffrey Goldsworthy ed., 2006); Mark Tushnet, The Warren Court
(1954-1968): Procedural Liberalism and Personal Freedom, in THE UNITED STATES
SUPREME COURT: THE PURSUIT OF JUSTICE 277 (Christopher Tomlins ed., 2005).
10. See, e.g., DEFINING THE FIELD OF COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (Vicki C.
Jackson & Mark Tushnet eds., 2002); Mark Tushnet, Scepticism about Judicial Review: A
Perspective from the United States, in SCEPTICAL ESSAYS ON HUMAN RIGHTS 359 (Tom
Campbell et al. eds., 2001) [hereinafter Tushnet, Scepticism]; Mark Tushnet, The Evolution of
Federalism in the United States: A Continuing Convention?, in TOWARDS A EUROPEAN
CONSTITUTION: A HISTORICAL AND POLITICAL COMPARISON WITH THE UNITED STATES 127
(Michael Gehler et al. eds., 2005).
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historian of, the Crits.11 After reading a draft law review article on
which I had asked him to comment,12 an invitation fraught for both
offeror and offeree with potential snares and present tensions perhaps
peculiar to academic marriages, he said, “It’s C.L.S.; no one does that
anymore.” So, when I received an invitation to contribute to this
Symposium shortly after that conversation, it made sense to take the
opportunity to use the disciplined luxury of reading closely (some of)
Mark Tushnet’s prodigious body of work to explore whether his passage
from C.L.S. to H.L.S., from moving Paul Carrington to announce the
end of civilization as he knew it,13 to becoming a member of legal
institutional elites, including but not limited to his identity as an
institutional player in the A.A.L.S.,14 meant that he was one of those
people who no longer “did” C.L.S.
I tentatively concluded that while Tushnet’s early, strongly Marxist,
work was unarguably C.L.S. in that it is both radical15 and interested in
making naturalized structures that reproduce hegemony visible, his
scholarly stance and voice now have much more in common with the
Realists. The likeness lies in this: while the Realists’ search for a
science that would satisfy their paradoxical and unacknowledged
11. See generally DAVID S. CAUDILL, DISCLOSING TILT: LAW, BELIEF, AND CRITICISM
37-69 (1989); RADICAL PHILOSOPHY OF LAW: CONTEMPORARY CHALLENGES TO
MAINSTREAM LEGAL THEORY AND PRACTICE (David S. Caudill & Steven Jay Gold eds.,
1995).
12. For the published version of that draft, see Penelope Pether, Sorcerers, Not
Apprentices: How Judicial Clerks and Staff Attorneys Impoverish U.S. Law, 39 ARIZ. ST. L.J.
1 (2007).
13. See Paul D. Carrington, Of Law and the River, 34 J. LEGAL. EDUC. 222, 227 (1984)
(suggesting that the nihilism he attributed to C.L.S. threatened “the professionalism and
intellectual courage” required by the legal profession). This is an achievement which
Professor Carrington’s recent work on lost opportunities for successful Western neocolonial
adventures in the Middle East leads the writer to yearn to emulate. See Paul D. Carrington,
Could and Should America Have Made an Ottoman Republic in 1919?, 49 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 1071 (2008).
14. Tushnet served as President for the American Association of Law Schools
(A.A.L.S.) in 2003. Tushnet Brings a Scholarly Slant to Presidency of AALS, GEORGETOWN
LAW, Fall/Winter 2003, at 2.
15. I say radical, although this work is radical more often to my mind in the pure sense
of that term, in that it is interested in origins; I have in mind here his revisionist legal
historical work on chattel slavery. See, e.g., MARK TUSHNET, THE AMERICAN LAW OF
SLAVERY, 1810-1860: CONSIDERATIONS OF HUMANITY AND INTEREST 230 (1981)
[hereinafter TUSHNET, SLAVERY] (advancing thinking about the radical egalitarian potential
of common law analogical reasoning); Mark Tushnet, Constructing Paternalist Hegemony:
Gross, Johnson, and Hadden on Slaves and Masters, 27 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 169 (2002)
(book reviews) (rehabilitating the authority of Genovese’s account of (more or less
benevolent) paternalist American slavery in the face of “postmodernist” revisionist histories).
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yearning for truth led them, after they “proved” legal science fallible, to
social science, Tushnet’s always already failed search is for reason, or at
least rationality, and for a type of modesty, at least as much as to justice
claims as truth claims, in legal institutions, subjects, and discourses.16
To recognize this, and to put it to one side, is to make visible the equally
characteristic but less assertive orientation to “Others” that runs through
Tushnet’s work.17
My attempt to understand how the domestic constitutional law
scholar and the radical jurisprude shaped the comparative constitutional
law scholar informed my reading of Tushnet’s work. “The place I
reached” in that inquiry, roughly, is that even in his comparativist work,
Mark Tushnet is either a profoundly American constitutional law
thinker, or he has pioneered a “third way” of doing constitutionalist
scholarship. Whichever position he occupies, he is not interested in
harvesting practices and insights from “away” to deploy at “home,” nor
in making his own understanding of constitutionalism more profound by
comparativist inquiry, but rather in using the American experience of
judicial review to counsel against reliance on it to promote
constitutionalism elsewhere. What I became much more interested in,
however, was understanding Tushnet’s evident sense of the failure of
judicial review to contribute to “the possibility of Justice.”18
Because I begin from, and argue that Tushnet has arrived at, a
different judgment than this about the responsibility of constitutional
court judges—and not just those serving on constitutional courts of final
jurisdiction—for constitutionalism, I attempt both to map Tushnet’s
constitutionalist commitments, or politics, and to position myself in
relation to them. Michael Seidman’s contribution to this Symposium
asked and offered an answer to a question related to the inquiry I have
just framed. He explores whether one can be both leftist (as he
described it, and what I would tentatively and provisionally call
critical)19 and a constitutionalist. Seidman suggests that one could

16.
17.

See, e.g., Tushnet, Scepticism, supra note 10, at 359.
See, e.g., MARK TUSHNET, SLAVE LAW IN THE AMERICAN SOUTH: STATE V. MANN
IN HISTORY AND LITERATURE (2003); Tushnet, Defending Korematsu?, supra note 1;
TUSHNET, SLAVERY, supra note 15.
18. See generally Jacques Derrida, Force of Law: The “Mystical Foundation of
Authority,” in DECONSTRUCTION AND THE POSSIBILITY OF JUSTICE 3, 4 (Drucilla Cornell et
al. eds., 1992).
19. To the extent that Tushnet’s early work was explicitly Marxist, see generally, Mark
Tushnet, A Marxist Analysis of American Law, 1 MARXIST PERSPECTIVES 96 (1978), and
because his stance in relation to judicial review seems to me to be profoundly Marxian in

PETHER - Final Edit 2 - 26-3

2008]

5/20/2008 9:23 PM

CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES

671

salvage Tushnet’s school of constitutionalism for leftism by rendering it
metaphorical, in that leftism could be constitutionalist if that
constitutionalism was immanent in a dream of camaraderie and critical
practice that might both expose and promise a space beyond the
“corruption, evil, and obfuscation”20 of the imperialists and oligarchs21
who are “those now in power.”22 My suggestion is that close reading
across Tushnet’s oeuvre locates its leftism in its orientation to the Other,
a commitment most clearly discernible in his early23 and most recent24
work.
My conclusion that Tushnet has become a distinctively neorealist
scholar of constitutionalism emerged from trying to make sense of my
own response to his characteristic scholarly-rhetorical stance and his
textual identity. It marks a point of departure from the commitments I
share with Tushnet: to the (or a) “thin Constitution,”25 especially to its
aspirational commitment to equality, and to “‘the struggle to achieve [a]

orientation, whereas my own is post-Foucauldian, it may be that the difference in terminology
is useful and ought to be maintained.
20. Louis Michael Seidman, Can Constitutionalism be Leftist?, 26 QUINNIPIAC L. REV.
557, 577 (2008).
Seidman calls these the “hallmarks of modern, mainstream
constitutionalism.” Id. I think he is mistaken here, because any serious account of
constitutionalism as more than a bare practice for allocating political power in the nation-state
necessarily implies some ethical engagement between subjects who govern and those who are
governed. Paul Kahn makes a similar point when he writes of Hannah Arendt’s lack of “faith
in reason,” and locates her “particular contribution” to understanding evil as identifying
“the banality of evil” in the character of Eichman. He could manage the final
solution, she claimed, because he had stopped thinking. Administrative rationality
did not itself require thought. Thinking for Arendt has a special quality of
recognizing and engaging the other: less pure reason, more dialogical engagement.
Eichmann could not imagine the world from the point of view of another subject.
Instead of thinking, he relied on clichés.
PAUL W. KAHN, OUT OF EDEN: ADAM AND EVE AND THE PROBLEM OF EVIL 7 (2007).
21. Seidman, supra note 20, at 575.
22. Id. at 577. This vision imbues conclusions in LOUIS MICHAEL SEIDMAN & MARK
V. TUSHNET, REMNANTS OF BELIEF: CONTEMPORARY CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES (1996). It
seems more characteristic of Seidman’s own constitutionalist thought than Tushnet’s, given
what I will go on to say about his paradoxical commitment to reason.
23. See TUSHNET, SLAVERY, supra note 15; MARK TUSHNET, THE NAACP’S LEGAL
STRATEGY AGAINST SEGREGATED EDUCATION, 1925-1950 (1987).
24. See Tushnet, Defending Korematsu?, supra note 1, at 136.
25. TUSHNET, TAKING, supra note 6, at 9-14. One could construct a rather different thin
constitution if one focused on structural aspects, for example, Federalism, the separation of
powers, representative government, republicanism, or democracy. Tushnet defines a thin
constitution “as its fundamental guarantees of equality, freedom of expression and liberty.
Note: Not ‘the First Amendment’ or ‘the equal protection clause.’” Id. at 11.
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justice’”26 that Tushnet calls indeterminate,27 and I would call
determinable though endlessly deferred. We also share an understanding
of law’s indeterminacy as a kind of “precommitment” of scholarly
positionality, although mine is, I think, a rather different one from
Tushnet’s, due to our differing normative judgments of the consequences
of the flawed truth claims of legal reasoning.28
There are, however, places—ones that perhaps are most evident in
our shared scholarly interest in comparative constitutional law—where
my own commitments and Tushnet’s diverge. Let me turn here to the
third epigraph to this Essay, registering as I do the apparent incongruity
of dropping the constitutional F-word, as in Frankfurter, in a symposium
in honor of Mark Tushnet.
One of the hazards of having spent a part of one’s professional life
as a literary critic is that one has a tendency to over-read authorial
subjects; nonetheless, it is hard to avoid identifying a distinct antipathy
in Tushnet’s writing for Felix Frankfurter—the man, not just the
jurisprude—an antipathy that I would call visceral, were it not so
cerebral. The antipathy to the man may stem from Frankfurter’s
attempted “white-anting”29 of Thurgood Marshall’s confirmation to the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals.30 The jurisprudential antipathy is also
grounded in Frankfurter’s acts, including both his undermining of

26. Mark Tushnet, Defending the Indeterminacy Thesis, in ANALYZING LAW: NEW
ESSAYS IN LEGAL THEORY 223, 238 (Brian Bix ed., 1998) [hereinafter Tushnet,
Indeterminacy].
27. Id.
28. See id. My own position on this shares something of Paul Kahn’s understanding of
law as a cultural practice, see generally PAUL W. KAHN, THE CULTURAL STUDY OF LAW:
RECONSTRUCTING LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP (1999), although not his evident distaste for
poststructuralist theory, see, e.g., KAHN, supra note 20, at 1, and also of Robin West’s
insistence that an intellectual “precommitment” to the indeterminacy thesis can be consistent
with a type of normative commitment (explicitly ethical rather than grounded in a
commitment to reason), see Robin West, Justice, Democracy, and Humanity: A Celebration of
the Work of Mark Tushnet, 90 GEO. L.J. 215, 219-220 (2001), that Tushnet seems extremely
reticent to articulate. To that extent, it has much more in common with Tushnet’s early
account of common law reasoning, see TUSHNET, SLAVERY, supra note 15, at 230, than his
more recent framing of the indeterminacy thesis as “informal political theory,” Tushnet,
Indeterminacy, supra note 26, at 224, and a condemnation of law’s pretence to a method for
producing truth, and thus to “democratic legitimacy,” id. at 226.
29. Kel
Richards,
White-ant,
ABC
NEWSRADIO,
http://www.abc.net.au/newsradio/txt/s1749419.htm (last visited Mar. 26, 2008) (“If someone
undermines you at work you might say they were ‘white-anting’ you. The Macquarie
Dictionary says the verb ‘to white-ant’ means ‘to subvert or undermine from within.’”).
30. JUAN WILLIAMS, THURGOOD MARSHALL: AMERICAN REVOLUTIONARY 296-97
(1998).
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Marshall’s insistence that the rights at stake in Brown v. Board of
Education31 were “personal and present,” and his proximate authorship
and sponsoring of the injunction that desegregation of schools proceed at
“all deliberate speed.”32 The antipathy seems more strongly influenced,
though, by Frankfurter’s jurisprudential commitments, which stem from
what I would call his judicial ontology.
Frankfurter was committed to “drawing the line between politics,
[here identified by Tushnet as] the domain of interest group pluralism,
and law, perhaps the domain of programmatic liberalism,”33 and Tushnet
clearly has doubts about Frankfurter’s intellect34 as well as his good
faith.35 In addition, Frankfurter believed both in stability and a
democracy much more populist than Tushnet’s (in the crudely
majoritarian sense of presuming to speak “for us all,” rather than in the
neologistic sense Tushnet employs when he uses the term in Taking the
Constitution Away from the Courts36). Frankfurter also believed in
lawyers as agents for an egalitarian reconstitution of the nation: “[He]
believed that leading Southern white lawyers, committed to the rule of

31.
32.

Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
See WILLIAMS, supra note 30, at 238-39 (noting Justice Frankfurter’s responsibility
for the insertion into the Brown opinion the phrase “all deliberate speed,” and his vigorous
critique of Marshall’s oral argument in Brown). See also id. at 216-17 (noting Marshall’s
perception of Frankfurter’s paradoxical insensitivity “to the minority perspective,” his
obtuseness about the nature of racial discrimination against blacks in the U.S., and his lack of
loyalty to the NAACP, which Frankfurter had advised while a member of the Harvard Law
School faculty).
33. TUSHNET, NEW, supra note 7, at 116. See also MARK TUSHNET, BROWN V. BOARD
OF EDUCATION: THE BATTLE FOR INTEGRATION 82-83 (1995) [hereinafter TUSHNET, BROWN]
(characterizing Frankfurter as “devoted in an almost religious way to ‘the law’ and opposed to
those who treated constitutional law as simply politics. . . . [, d]isdainful of those who treated
law as politics, . . . . [and] so torn by his concerns about law and politics that he couldn’t”
initially sign on to the decision to declare school segregation unconstitutional).
34. MARK TUSHNET, MAKING CIVIL RIGHTS LAW: THURGOOD MARSHALL AND THE
SUPREME COURT, 1936-1961, at 169, 176-77, 194, 203-04, 205, 208, 260, 261 (1994)
[hereinafter TUSHNET, CIVIL RIGHTS]; TUSHNET, NEW, supra note 7, at 114.
35. TUSHNET, NEW, supra note 7, at 121 (“Frankfurter . . . made a political judgment
about the best course to pursue and found a principled basis in the law to justify the rule
embodying that judgment.”). See also TUSHNET, BROWN, supra note 33, at 92 (casting doubt
on both the Justice’s intellect and his good faith); TUSHNET, CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 34, at
165, 178-79, 180, 181, 183, 186, 187, 192-93, 195, 203, 205, 219, 220, 228, 229, 265-66, 276,
277-78, 286, 338 n.20.
36. TUSHNET, TAKING, supra note 6.
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law, could—if the Court gave them time—bring the rest of the white
South along. He was wrong.”37
Frankfurter is of course something of a shifting signifier, as
suggested by the aporia between the socially tone-deaf elitist dolt who
emerges from the pages of Making Civil Rights Law,38 and the
sophisticated theorist of legal hermeneutics in Rabinowitz;39 this is
something Tushnet clearly registers: the white-anter of Marshall was
also the mentor of Charles Hamilton Houston.40 Frankfurter is at once
an adherent of law, as distinct from politics, and an early practitioner of
Realism, who instructed Houston in the ways of the social science that
became so central to the theory advanced in Brown, yet drew the teeth
that might have enabled the Court to do what Tushnet has repeatedly
concluded that it did not do, and that it is dangerous folly for us to
imagine it could do, if only the “right” people were on the bench:
fundamentally change the racial inequality that has never ceased to
constitute “us.” It is possible too to find some ironic congruence
between Frankfurter’s professed commitment to “judicial deference to
decisions taken by democratic majorities”41—a commitment that seems
portentously sinister in the hindsight offered by a familiarity with
Scalian Eighth Amendment and substantive due process jurisprudence—
and Tushnet’s own faith in a “popular constitution.” Frankfurter and
Tushnet, in other words, are committed to rather different forms of
populism, which always risks communitarianism.
From an egalitarian perspective, Justice Frankfurter’s record in the
jurisprudential territory represented by this Essay’s third epigraph,
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, invites rather different normative
judgments from his position on civil rights. To that extent, he has
something in common with his fellow “wrong judge”42 on the Warren

37. TUSHNET, BROWN, supra note 33, at 108. See also id. at 75 (noting that during the
oral arguments in Brown, “Justice Frankfurter brought up what he called ‘certain facts of life,’
by which he referred to states ‘where there is a vast congregation of Negro population’”).
38. TUSHNET, CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 34.
39. United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 69 (1950). See also supra note 3.
40. Houston was the visionary civil rights lawyer who was Dean at Howard University
Law School when Marshall was a student there; he became head of the N.A.A.C.P.’s legal
office, where Marshall worked with and learned from him. Houston was the first AfricanAmerican Editor-in-Chief of Harvard Law Review.
41. TUSHNET, NEW, supra note 7, at 114.
42. Mark Tushnet, Response: A New Constitutionalism for Liberals?, 28 N.Y.U. REV.
L. & SOC. CHANGE 357, 357 (2003) [hereinafter Tushnet, Liberals] (“For liberal
constitutional theorists the Warren Court, or Justice Brennan, basically got everything right
. . . .”) (footnote omitted).
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Court, Justice Jackson, a pathbreaking international humanitarian lawyer
whom Tushnet calls on his ambivalence about desegregation.43
Jackson’s position on the appropriateness of juridifying the “state of
exception” that was the Third Reich differs from that which Mark
Tushnet privileges in The Constitution in Wartime. I want to pick up on
that difference as I go on to make a case for a position which I think is
consistent with Tushnet’s suggestive meditation on Others44 in that
book, a meditation that complicates his characteristic critique of
constitutional juridification elsewhere in the text,45 and also arguably in
Taking the Constitution Away from the Courts,46 which is, as Tushnet
writes of Lincoln, subtle,47 for all its overt anti-juridification
commitments.
I differ from Tushnet in that seminal work in that I think it is time
to give the courts back their share of responsibility for the Constitution.
Judicial review has not always amounted, basically or otherwise, to
“noise around zero.”48 Nor yet is there anything about it that makes it
essentially or necessarily meaningless if one’s commitments are to a
genuinely egalitarian democracy. In cases that matter practically to
structurally subordinated people, it may be critical. Thus, I think
Tushnet is right, in his “post 9/11 Constitution” work,49 to invite the
suggestion that the “social learning” thesis underpinning much of his
scholarship against constitutional juridification and for constitutional
democratization,50 including his comparative constitutional work,51
depends on an optimistic Whig historical argument for social learning52
about exceptionalist government power—that is, we learn from history
to circumscribe our excesses.
43.
44.
45.

TUSHNET, CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 34, at 188-91, 211-12.
Tushnet, Defending Korematsu?, supra note 1, at 136.
Mark Tushnet, Emergencies and Constitutionalism, in THE CONSTITUTION IN
WARTIME: BEYOND ALARMISM AND COMPLACENCY 39, 40 (Mark Tushnet ed., 2005)
[hereinafter Tushnet, Emergencies and Constitutionalism].
46. TUSHNET, TAKING, supra note 6, at 163-64 (differentiating “constitutional” and
“legal” controls on executive power, discussing the doctrine of ultra vires). Tushnet does not
differentiate those from “abuse of process” or “natural justice,” which might arguably provide
for a “thin constitution” via judicial review that is, pace Tushnet, constitutional as well as
legal, because of the multiple locations of constitutional authority in English law.
47. TUSHNET, TAKING, supra note 6, at 8-9.
48. Id. at 153.
49. See generally, Tushnet, Defending Korematsu?, supra note 1.
50. Tushnet calls this populism. See TUSHNET, TAKING, supra note 6, at ix, 9, 157,
181, 184, 194.
51. See, e.g., Tushnet, Scepticism, supra note 10, at 359.
52. Tushnet, Defending Korematsu?, supra note 1, at 136.
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There is much in recent Fourth Amendment incursions by the
current government and in its innovations in executive lawlessness53
which suggests that Whig historicism on social learning by members of
the expanded Executive branch is misplaced. Similarly, manifestations
of populist hysteria about the permeable and symbolic Southern border,
as well as events including the atrocities at Abu Ghraib and Haditha
suggest that “the people” can be as prone as their elected leaders and
those of “us” who do their bidding—the Lewis Libbys and the Monica
Goodlings and the Alberto Gonzaleses, lawyers and citizens all—not to
learn from history about the perils of the state of exception. One could
of course identify less exotic and more mundane examples of domestic
exceptionalism, and suggest that the national foreign policy’s “focus . . .
on the Other”54 is a species of return of the nation’s constitutive
repressed. This is discoverable, for example, in the blasted landscapes
and blighted communities of West Philadelphia or East St. Louis, those
jurisdictions of exception of different kinds “we” produce in “the
homeland.”
These “others” have their paradigms in the most desperate of
indigenous communities constructed, especially in Australia’s Eastern
states, on the foundations of the apartheid-inspired Reserves or
Missions. There, many indigenous Australians were confined after the
colonizing English “settlers”’ or “invaders”’55 drive for land—the
paradigmatic private property, the locus of what some56 (I am not one)
call the primary constitutional right, at once private and democratic57—
denied them their traditional country.58 They also have their paradigms

53. I refer here to the 2007 imbroglio over U.S. Attorney firings. See, e.g., Dan Eggen
& Paul Kane, Judge Gives Immunity to Gonzales Aide, WASH. POST, May 12, 2007, at A5;
Dan Eggen & Paul Kane, Goodling Says She ‘Crossed the Line’; Ex-Justice Aide Criticizes
Gonzales While Admitting to Basing Hires on Politics, WASH. POST, May 24, 2007, at A1;
David Johnston & Carl Hulse, Aide to Attorney General Refuses to Testify About Dismissals,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 27, 2007, at A17; Eric Lipton, Colleagues Cite Partisan Focus by Justice
Official, N.Y. TIMES, May 12, 2007, at A1.
54. Tushnet, Defending Korematsu?, supra note 1, at 136.
55. See, e.g., HENRY REYNOLDS, DISPOSSESSION: BLACK AUSTRALIANS AND WHITE
INVADERS (1989).
56. See generally Cass R. Sunstein, On Property and Constitutionalism, in
CONSTITUTIONALISM, IDENTITY, DIFFERENCE AND LEGITIMACY: THEORETICAL
PERSPECTIVES 383 (Michel Rosenfeld ed., 1994).
57. See id. at 390.
58. See, e.g., THE AUSTRALIAN PEOPLE: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE NATION, ITS
PEOPLE, AND THEIR ORIGINS 144-45 (James Jupp ed., 2nd ed. 2001).
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in Northern Australia, on the “desart and uncultiv[able]”59 margins to
where indigenous people, who had lived in an exploited symbiosis with
cattle barons on what had been their traditional lands, were banished
after they had the temerity to sue for award wages (rather than rations) in
exchange for their labor, and the courts had ruled in their favor.60
My own considerable reservations about the reliability of “the
people” or democracy to constitute the kind of nation to which Mark
Tushnet is committed emerge in part from the insights gleaned from the
incidents of my “accidental comparativism.” A faith in electoral politics
as the only or most reliable guarantor of egalitarian democracy is
difficult to sustain when one has seen Pauline Hanson61 elected to the
Australian Federal legislature, and has seen mainstream conservative
politics in Australia strategically remake itself in Hanson’s image (to its
enormous electoral good fortune).62 A notable example of the successful
59. My reference here is to Blackstone’s characterization of lands “desart and
uncultivated,” WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 1 COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 107
(University of Chicago Press, 1979) (1765), as subject to settlement under British colonial
law, and thus, unlike “occupied” colonial territories subject to conquest or cession, not
containing any pre-existing law. In Mabo v. Queensland II (1992) 175 C.L.R. 1 (Austl.), the
Australian High Court assimilated “Blackstone’s concept of ‘desart and uncultivated’ land . . .
to the concept of terra nullius in international law,” while acknowledging the fact of the
indigenous peoples’ presence on the continent as historically inaccurate at the moment of
“settlement,” and rather than directly addressing the question as to the status of Australia’s
colonial occupation, assimilated “the rules for a ‘settled’ colony, where there was an existing
population, . . . to the rules for a ‘conquered’ colony.” TONY BLACKSHIELD & GEORGE
WILLIAMS, AUSTRALIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND THEORY 183-84 (4th ed. 2006)
(emphasis in original). Blackshield and Williams suggest that in doing so “the Court may
have left its historical re-analysis incomplete.” Id. at 184. The result of that historical reanalysis was the recognition by Australian law of a very limited (both in its scope and in the
capacity of indigenous peoples to establish it) common law native title land right that has been
narrowed still further by subsequent legislation and judge-made law. Id. at ch. 5. Those parts
of the Northern Territory referred to above are often literally uncultivable because of their
aridity, although they will support extremely large scale commercial cattle-grazing operations.
60. This outcome resonates with the aftermath of Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6
Peters) 515 (1832), when President Andrew Jackson refused to enforce the Supreme Court’s
holding one of Georgia’s Extension Acts, part of a strategy to take Cherokee land and drive
the Cherokee west, “repugnant to the Constitution, laws, and treaties of the United States,” id.
at 521. The dispossession of the Cherokee followed.
61. For those of my readership unfamiliar with the history of Australia’s One Nation
party, I will describe Pauline Hanson as a much more dangerous, much more rhetorically
astute, female antipodean David Duke. See, e.g., Mike Steketee, And the Beat Goes On,
AUSTRALIAN, Sept. 8, 2006, at 13 (discussing Pauline Hanson’s rise to political power in
Australia and noting her influence on John Howard’s policies).
62. See, e.g., id. See also DAVID MARR & MARIAN WILKINSON, DARK VICTORY 58,
120, 234, 375, 377, 381 (2003). The recent election of the Rudd Labor government in
Australia, followed in rapid succession by the making of a long-overdue apology to
Australia’s indigenous peoples, which the successive Howard governments had steadfastly
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electoral politics of excepting the Other from the jurisdiction of law can
be found in the events chronicled in David Marr and Marian Wilkinson’s
Dark Victory.63 These events essentially involved an electoral strategy
of placing paradigmatic “post 9/11” refugees—predominantly from
Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iraq—beyond the jurisdiction of Australian
courts through driving the figurative (and tragically eventually literal)
death traps of boats in which they had been sold passage by people
smugglers out of Australian waters.64
Thus, one might argue that there is little difference for the prospects
of egalitarian democracy—or justice—between taking the position that
things would be wonderful constitutionally if we could only get Justice
Brennan back,65 and hoping that “the people” might elect another
constitutionalist as astute and subtle as Tushnet argues Lincoln was,66 or
thinking that encouraging populist constitutional literacy is likely to
produce constitutionalism. This is, I think, registered in the cases of the
first of two—perhaps unlikely—constitutionalists who might look like
very odd reference points in a contribution to a symposium honoring
Mark Tushnet: Jacques Chirac and Noel Pearson.
The former is, I suspect, more familiar to my present readership
than the latter. I am invoking Chirac here because of his skeptical
interrogation of what we mean when we speak and write of democracy,
especially if our commitments are to egalitarian democracy. Before the
invasion of Iraq, Chirac, who had fought a colonialist war, told a
patronizing Tony Blair three things, one of which was that he (and by
implication the U.S. government and its allies in the “Coalition of the
Willing”) should not confuse an Iraq governed by a Shi’ite majority with
a democratically-governed Iraq.67 This is to say that I have much less

refused to do, might seem to make Tushnet’s case. My point, however, is not that the “the
people” sometimes “get it right” from the perspectives of those on the Left, but rather that
egalitarian social justice has its best chances when legislature, executive, judiciary, and
citizens all accept their responsibility for constitutionalism.
63. MARR & WILKINSON, supra note 62.
64. See generally id.
65. See Tushnet, Liberals, supra note 42, at 357 (“[L]iberal constitutional theory’s
vision of the future is nostalgia for the past. For liberal constitutional theorists the Warren
Court, or Justice Brennan, basically got everything right . . . . [For liberal constitutional
theorists] all that needs to be done today (or tomorrow, or after the next presidential election,
or . . .) is to appoint justices in the mold of Warren, Brennan, or Thurgood Marshall.”).
66. TUSHNET, TAKING, supra note 6, at 8-9.
67. See Geoffrey Wheatcroft, The Calamity of Iraq Has Not Even Won Us Cheap Oil,
THE GUARDIAN, Nov. 2, 2007, at 37. Sir Stephen Wall described a meeting between Chirac
and Tony Blair:
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faith than Mark Tushnet in the safety of entrusting constitutionalism to
“the people.” Pierre Bourdieu argues that the invocation of “the people”
is a preferred strategy for conservatism,68 and certainly a reading of
Scalian Eighth Amendment and substantive due process jurisprudence
provides some evidence in support of this claim. My own rather
different suggestion is that rhetorical gambits have in common with
modes of critical inquiry their availability for deployment in a wide
range of political projects.
What of the courts, and of Noel Pearson? Pearson is, like me, a
University of Sydney-educated lawyer; like me, constitutional law is
something on which he spends a fair amount of his time.69 There,
obvious similarities end: Pearson is an indigenous Australian man and a
practitioner of both law and the politics of indigenous governance at
once visionary and strategic. But other similarities begin: Pearson has
passed scathing judgment of what the Yorta Yorta Court made in 2002
of the flawed but historic promise of Mabo. That decision of the High
Court of Australia either, for all its fundamentally flawed gesturing
towards justice, assumed responsibility for a role in “settl[ing] the
outstanding question of indigenous land justice in Australia,”70 or, as
Elizabeth Povinelli has forcefully argued, amounted to nothing more

[Chirac] reminded Blair that he and his friend Bush knew nothing of the reality
of war but that he did: 50 years ago, the young Chirac served as a conscript in the
awful French war in Algeria, which Iraq resembles in all too many ways. Then he
said that the Anglo-Saxons seemed to think that they would be welcomed with open
arms, but they shouldn’t count on it. In a very percipient point, Chirac added that a
Shia majority shouldn’t be confused with what we understand as democracy.
He ended by asking whether Blair realised that, by invading Iraq, he might yet
precipitate a civil war there. As the British left, Blair turned to his colleagues and
said . . . , “Poor old Jacques, he just doesn’t get it.”
Id.

68. PIERRE BOURDIEU, IN OTHER WORDS: ESSAYS TOWARDS A REFLEXIVE
SOCIOLOGY 152-53 (Matthew Adamson trans., 1990).
69. He devotes time to constitutional law both as a matter of practice, as in his
directorships of the Cape York Institute for Policy and Leadership and of the Cape York
Partnerships, see CAPE YORK INSTITUTE FOR POLICY AND LEADERSHIP,
http://www.cyi.org.au/ (last visited Mar. 24, 2008); CAPE YORK PARTNERSHIPS,
http://www.capeyorkpartnerships.com/team/noelpearson/index.htm (last visited Mar. 24,
2008), and in his writing, see generally Noel Pearson, The High Court’s Abandonment of ‘The
Time-Honored Methodology of the Common Law’ in its Interpretation of Native Title in
Mirriuwung Gajerrong and Yorta Yorta, 7 NEWCASTLE L. REV. 1-14 (2003).
70. Pearson, supra note 69, at 4.

PETHER - Final Edit 2 - 26-3

680

5/20/2008 9:23 PM

QLR

[Vol. 26:667

than an attempt by the common law of Australia to rehabilitate itself for
the nation’s constitutive colonialist injustice.71
In the ominously precedential Yorta Yorta decision,72 the High
Court of Australia concluded, 5-2, that the Native Title Act recognized
only those interests in land “rooted in . . . traditional law and traditional
custom,”73 that is, effectively frozen in time in 1788 at the point of the
British “Crown’s acquisition of sovereignty and radical title” to the lands
that were made to constitute Australia.74 The failure of the Yorta Yorta
claim resulted from the insistence of Chief Justice Gleeson and Justices
Gummow and Hayne (with whom Justice Callinan75 and a grudging
Justice McHugh76 concurred) that only rights and interests in land
deriving from traditional law and customs existing as at 1788 “that
ha[ve] had a continuous existence and vitality”77 until the present day are
recognizable under the Act.78 The alternative—which Justice McHugh
reasoned79 (and Noel Pearson agreed80) the Keating government had
intended in passing the Native Title Act—would have enabled the
incidents of Native Title to “be determined in accordance with the
developing common law” of Australia,81 something more than “noise
around zero,” if less than what justice might counsel. As Noel Pearson
put it:
[After Yorta Yorta, t]he three principles of native title law are not that the
whitefellas get to keep all that they have accumulated, that the blackfellas get
what is left over and they share some larger categories of land titles with the
granted titles prevailing over the native title. Rather the three principles of
native title are that the whitefellas do not only get to keep all that they have
accumulated, but the blacks only get a fraction of what is left over and only get
to share a coexisting and subservient title where they are able to surmount the
most unreasonable and unyielding barriers of proof – and indeed only where

71. See ELIZABETH A. POVINELLI, THE CUNNING OF RECOGNITION: INDIGENOUS
ALTERITIES AND THE MAKING OF AUSTRALIAN MULTICULTURALISM 35-69, 153-185 (2002).
72. Members of the Yorta Yorta Aboriginal Cmty. v. Victoria (2002) 214 C.L.R. 422
(Austl.).
73. Id. at 442.
74. Id. at 441-44.
75. Id. at 494.
76. Yorta Yorta, 214 C.L.R. at 468.
77. Id. at 444.
78. Id. at 456-58.
79. Id. at 467-68.
80. Pearson, supra note 69, at 4-5.
81. Yorta Yorta, 214 C.L.R. at 468 (McHugh, J., concurring).
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they prove that they meet white Australia’s cultural and legal prejudices about
82
what constitutes “real Aborigines.”

Pearson, then, has urged on the Australian High Court its
responsibility for keeping the thin constitution—or constitutionalism—
as a precept. Australia’s High Court, in the years since the Native Title
decision Mabo v. Queensland (No. 2)83 and the populist backlash against
it, has come to share with the U.S. Supreme Court much of what Paul
Kahn calls a preference for sustaining its own legitimacy over
development of expertise.84 This is a phenomenon whose U.S.
instantiation Mark Tushnet explores with his characteristic subtlety in
The New Constitutional Order, describing justices who “present
themselves not as theorists of constitutional law but as serious-minded
adjudicators.”85 In the “post 9/11” Australian constitutional context, that
tendency has been most evident in asylum seeker jurisprudence, where
the Court’s emerging jurisprudence on Chapter III judicial power brings
Korematsu86 to mind.
I will return to Korematsu, and to both Chapter III and Article III
judicial power later in this Essay, but for my purposes here, I will make
Pearson signify in the way that I read Mark Tushnet’s rhetoric of
opposition to juridification of the Constitution. Pearson has recently
become a figure of controversy among those on the Left who might be
expected to offer him nothing but praise. The controversy has arisen in
relation to his careful,87 if self-consciously provocative,88 expressions of

82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

Pearson, supra note 69, at 4.
Mabo v. Queensland II (1992) 175 C.L.R. 1 (Austl.).
Kahn, supra note 2, at 2696.
TUSHNET, NEW, supra note 7, at 123.
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (holding constitutional an
executive order excluding Americans of Japanese descent from areas of the West Coast and
detaining them).
87. See, e.g., Martin Flanagan, Pearson’s Crucial Role for Howard, THE AGE, July 3,
2007, at 11 (noting that some aspects of the Howard Government’s plan to intervene in remote
indigenous communities had been described by Pearson as “clumsy and ideological”); Cosima
Marriner et al., Pearson Lashes Out at Critics of Howard Plan, THE AGE, June 27, 2007, at 6
(“[Pearson was] not comfortable with all elements of the [Federal government’s] plan,
expressing particular concern that it would penalise responsible parents by docking their
welfare payments.”).
88. See, e.g., Flanagan, supra note 87 (“In recent years, Pearson has taken most
opportunities that have come his way to express his scorn—contempt, in fact, would not be
too strong a word—for the sentimentality of white sympathizers with black Australia who
deliver nothing in policy terms while the crisis in Aboriginal communities worsens.”).
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support89 for recent initiatives by the Howard Government to take
steps—including using the military to intervene in remote indigenous
communities90—in ostensible order to change a culture in which children
experience sexual assault at high levels.
A classic manifestation of the Howard government’s at once tonedeaf and electorally astute politics of discriminating against Others can
be found in its reactive and pre-emptive decision to ban the consumption
of alcohol in these communities.91 That ban is reminiscent of the legal
strategies of White Australia’s genocidal paternalism before the various
moves—by governments, the electorate, and the courts in the period
from the early 1960s to the election of the first Howard government in
1996—to clothe indigenous Australians with some civil rights.92 High
levels of sexual abuse of women and children (like high levels of alcohol
and drug addiction) are frequent symptoms of what are often framed as,
or blamed on, the pathologies of post-apartheid communities, but which
are rather tragically predictable inheritances from the legalized
dehumanization93 characteristic of both apartheid and the enslavement
that in some parts of Australia was its precursor. These are all things of
which Pearson is aware.
I interpret some of Tushnet’s positions, from an expression of
sympathy for libertarianism to the anti-juridification and populist
constitutional politics of Taking the Constitution Away from the Courts,
to be akin to Pearson’s positions on the Australian government takeover
of indigenous communities as a response to the phenomenon of the
apparently widespread sexual abuse of children. Those rhetorical
positions are designed to shock liberal legalism—exemplified by the
“leftist” academic lawyers, who are, after all, the primary audience of
Tushnet’s scholarly work—out of its “McCleskey problem.”94
89. See, e.g., Marriner et al., supra note 87 (“Noel Pearson has launched a stinging
attack on opponents of the radical plan to stop child sex abuse in remote Aboriginal
communities, branding the hostility ‘a form of madness’. . . . [Pearson stated,] ‘The minute
somebody suggests trying to do something decisive about it, you (the media) run all of them
finding every excuse under the sun not to do anything.’”).
90. See, e.g., Marriner et al., supra note 87.
91. See, e.g., Jo Chandler, Attempting To Make Up for Decades of Neglect, THE AGE,
June 22, 2007, at 5.
92. See, e.g., BLACKSHIELD & WILLIAMS, supra note 59, at ch. 5.
93. Lola McNaughton has labeled these symptoms of such treatment as part of a “sociosomatic illness.” See Oliver Feltham, Singularity Happening in Politics: The Aboriginal Tent
Embassy, Canberra 1972, 37 COMM. & COGNITION 225, 238 (2004).
94. Judith Resnik, Singular and Aggregate Voices: Audiences and Authority in Law &
Literature and in Law & Feminism, in 2 LAW AND LITERATURE: CURRENT LEGAL ISSUES
687, 692 (Michael Freeman & Andrew D.E. Lewis eds., 1999) (describing the McCleskey
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It is possible to discern, in the failure of the Supreme Court to
discharge its “assumed responsibility” for righting the national
constitutional flaw (which Brown and McCleskey95 in their different
ways signify), the grounds for a conclusion that imbues much of Mark
Tushnet’s comparative as well as domestic constitutional law
scholarship: that judicial review by a nation’s constitutional court of
final jurisdiction is not a legal institutional structure for one committed
to equality to place much faith in, and thus that the promise of
constitutionalism lies in the domain of politics rather than that of law. It
might be read differently, however, as Duncan Kennedy’s suggestive
conclusion to his testament of the failure of constitutional faith,
American Constitutionalism as Civil Religion: Notes of an Atheist,96
leads me to conclude. “[F]ascism and stalinism,” he writes, both made
“the realist impulse look positively obscene in Europe,” and made C.L.S.
possible.97
That seminal chapter in the history of the exception of the Other
from law’s responsibility might be said to be the most significant lesson
that a scholar of comparative constitutional law can take from the origins
of modern comparative constitutionalism, as Michael Kirby—like Noel
Pearson, no stranger to the ontology of Otherness98—registered in his at
once stinging and agonized 2004 dissent in Fardon (a case on Chapter
III judicial power and on constitutional criminal procedure).99 This is a
site where, in Australia and the United States, post-9/11 circumscription
by the state of civil liberties of the foreign “Other” shows signs of
bleeding over into the treatment of those accused of domestic crimes. In
arguing for the necessity of judicial review of incursions into
constitutionalism by the State, Justice Kirby invoked the original
Schmittian nightmare, that paradigmatic “state of exception”100
problem as “Legal Culture’s self-regard and self-celebration,” which make it “difficult to
convince the unconvinced in law of a relationship between an individual instance and a larger
social phenomenon, when both the individual instance and the larger social phenomenon are
claimed to betray liberal democracy’s legal commitments to fairness and inclusion”).
95. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
96. Duncan Kennedy, American Constitutionalism as Civil Religion: Notes of an
Atheist, 19 NOVA L. REV. 909, 920-21 (1995).
97. Id. at 921.
98. See, e.g., Michael Kirby, Remembering Wolfenden, MEANJIN, Sept. 2007, at 127
(vividly recalling the horror and shame of his closeted life as a homosexual law student in
Australia).
99. Fardon v. Attorney-General (Queensland) (2004) 210 A.L.R. 50, 101 (Austl.).
100. CARL SCHMITT, POLITICAL THEOLOGY: FOUR CHAPTERS ON THE CONCEPT OF
SOVEREIGNTY 5 (George Schwab trans., MIT Press 1985) (1922) (famously theorizing,
“[s]overeign is he who decides on the exception”).

PETHER - Final Edit 2 - 26-3

684

5/20/2008 9:23 PM

QLR

[Vol. 26:667

constituted by the governance of Germany from 1933 to 1945: a culture,
inter alia, of jurisdiction-stripping.101
Michael Kirby’s model of comparative constitutionalism in the
Chapter III cases differs markedly from that of recently retired Justice
Michael McHugh. Comparing the backlash against the Warren Court in
the wake of Brown to that experienced by the High Court after the Mabo
and Wik decisions, McHugh described Wik in Western Australia v. Ward
as “one of the most controversial decisions given by [the] Court . . . .
[which] subjected the Court to unprecedented criticism and abuse,”102
and suggested that the persisting foundational constitutional injury to
Australia’s indigenous citizens is beyond the capacity of law to
redress.103 In one of the Chapter III decisions dealing with asylumseekers, Justice McHugh concluded that, absent a written Bill of Rights,
Ahmed Al-Kateb’s indefinite detention by legislatively-authorized
executive fiat was the business of the tragedian but not of the jurist.104
In the more assertive parts of The Constitution in Wartime,105 Mark
Tushnet suggests that Justice McHugh’s brand of judicial
exceptionalism, if not Korematsu, can be forcefully defended. In other
words, at once arguing against and explicating the ambiguity of his own
diffident conclusion in Defending Korematsu?, Tushnet contends that
there may be a virtue in the exceptionalist judicial politics manifested in
judges refusing to “make exercises of emergency powers compatible
with constitutional norms as the judge[s] articulate them”106 by
“treat[ing] war as presenting the possibility of justifying a widespread
suspension of legality.”107 It should be clear from what I have written
that my own position on this question is much closer to that of Michael
Kirby than that of Michael McHugh. That position is influenced by my
own recent work on U.S. courts, which concludes that both the
acquiescence of state appellate and federal courts in jurisdictionstripping by other branches of government which limits judicial review
of the state’s exceptionalist treatment of “Others,” and their own covert

101.
102.

Fardon, 210 A.L.R. at 101.
Western Australia v. Ward (Miriuwung-Gajerrong Case) (2002) 213 C.L.R. 1, 213

(Austl.).
103. Id. at 240-41.
104. Al-Kateb v. Godwin (2004) 219 C.L.R. 562, 581, 595 (Austl.).
105. See Tushnet, Defending Korematsu?, supra note 1, at 135-36; Tushnet, Emergencies
and Constitutionalism, supra note 45, at 40, 49-50, 51.
106. Tushnet, Defending Korematsu?, supra note 1, at 136.
107. Tushnet, Emergencies and Constitutionalism, supra note 45, at 40. See also id. at
49-50.
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abandonment of their responsibility to the least powerful among “us,”
constitute a massive national crisis of judicial ontology, of responsibility
for constitutionalism that is practiced more pervasively by courts other
than the U.S. Supreme Court.108
My current comparative work on Chapter III and Article III judging
has convinced me of nothing more profoundly than of the need—one I
think both a genuinely attentive reading of The Constitution in Wartime,
and a rhetorically acute reading of Taking the Constitution Away from
the Courts, show Tushnet is manifestly aware of—to confront the judges
and the courts, the juridical institutions they staff, administer, constitute,
and are constituted by, with their practical responsibility for maintaining
constitutionalism.
The tone of Elizabeth Povinelli’s work on the High Court of
Australia has much in common with that of Tushnet’s jeremiad against
naively optimistic assessments of judicial review, and the critical legal
scholarship of both produces astonishingly rich insights. But when, as in
Mark Tushnet’s suggestive orientation to “the Other” just before the end
of Defending Korematsu?,109 he sees the Other face to face, he extends
an invitation to read in his most recent constitutional law scholarship a
resurgence of the orientation to Others that was the ground of his
scholarly work, and thus to conclude that one does not have to move
from the realm of hermeneutics to that of metaphor to identify his
commitment to constitutionalism.
That commitment is premised on a “thin constitution” that promises
two things. First, that it might shield us and Others from at least the
worst excesses of the violence of state tyranny. Second, it encodes what
may be cynical rhetoric, aspirational constitutive national text, denial
that is admission of the originary national pathology that eats out the
nation’s core, or all of these things. That is, a commitment to equality in
a nation with a government “defective from the start,”110 founded on
chattel slavery and persistently unwilling to address that inheritance
from the Founders, a pervasive structural subordination of Others that
imbricates its fiber yet.

108. See generally Penelope Pether, Inequitable Injunctions: The Scandal of Private
Judging in the U.S. Courts, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1435 (2004); Pether, supra note 12; Penelope
Pether, Take a Letter, Your Honor: Outing the Judicial Epistemology of Hart v. Massanari, 62
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1553 (2005).
109. Tushnet, Defending Korematsu?, supra note 1.
110. TUSHNET, CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 34, at 5 (citing Thurgood Marshall, Reflections
on the Bicentennial of the United States Constitution, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1, 2 (1987)).

